This remarkably clear and comprehensive account of empirical knowledge will be valuable to all students of epistemology and philosophy. The author begins from an explanationist analysis of knowing--a belief counts as knowledge if, and only if, its truth enters into the best explanation for its being held. Defending common sense and scientific realism within the explanationist framework, Alan Goldman provides a new foundational approach to justification. The view that emerges is broadly empiricist, counteracting the recently dominant trend that rejects that framework entirely.Topics treated include the Gettier problem, the nature of explanation and inductive inference, the justification of foundations for knowledge in terms of inference to the best explanation, the possibility of realist interpretations of contemporary science, reference (as it bears on recent antirealist arguments), and the relations between empirical psychology and epistemology. Professor Goldman defends the
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From the Inside Flap:
"In both conception and execution this is a fine book. . . . Goldman's treatment is fresh and invigorating."—Frederick Schmitt, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
"[Goldman's] theory of knowing is novel, powerful and yet fairly simple. His attack on skepticism is as persuasive and as well worked-out as any I know."—William Gregory Lycan, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
About the Author:
Alan H. Goldman is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Miami.
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